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*49  CLIMATE CHANGE AND CAUSATION: JOINING LAW AND CLIMATE SCIENCE ON THE BASIS OF
FORMAL LOGIC
I. Introduction
A strict application of legal tests to find the cause of an event, combined with a traditional emphasis on finding the necessary
cause in a counterfactual inquiry and a judicial demand of certainty, sets a high threshold for making causal statements. Often,
this threshold of the “but for” test has been found to be over-exclusionary.1 In the context of climate change, the emerging field
of probabilistic event attribution provides significant information to explain past events and to forecast future events related
to anthropogenic climate change.2 This field of climate science focuses on making robust statements about the role of climate
change, quantifying changes in the likelihood of extreme weather events and attributing these to greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions or even certain emitters. For example, one *50  study looking at the Argentina 2013-2014 heatwave found that
this event was made five times more likely due to total anthropogenic emissions and attributed thirty seven percent of that
probabilistic increase to GHG emissions of the European Union.3
Given that climate scientists are now able to make robust statements quantifying the likelihood of extreme weather events in
changing climate conditions, does this allow us to make causal inferences, ultimately ascertaining responsibility in law? We
argue that the traditional “but for” or “conditio sine qua non” inquiries used to establish causal relations are inadequate to
develop legally meaningful causal explanations in the climate change context. However, a coherent approach to causal analysis
is possible within a matrix we introduce. While not attempting to offer a full philosophically rooted, universal model of a theory
on causality,4 we expose some criteria that the law uses to test causation in the hope to subject these to a much needed discussion
of climate change and causation which will affect international law, domestic law, and climate science. Our matrix is based
on the observation that in different categories of cases outside climate change, courts occasionally soften the legal concept of
causation to recognize fairness considerations when differentiating mere co-relation from cause and effect. These normative
judgments govern the measure of damages recoverable in tort law and in contract law.5
*51  However, this article does not focus on the normative dimension of legal causation, where the outcome of cases is adjusted
if the mechanistic application of the “but for” test yields unfair results. These cases are only used as examples to demonstrate
that a strict causal tests is not consistently upheld, that instead courts are prepared to comply with demands of fairness and
justice. Accordingly, these exceptional cases are discussed with a view to tracing three major challenges that this approach
entails for making coherent causal inferences in the climate change context. As a special case in point for climate litigation, the
decision of the Essen Court of First Instance (Landgericht Essen) in Lluiya v RWE is used to demonstrate that a mechanistic
application of causal tests will remain insufficient.6
For the analytical part of this paper, we then concentrate on developing a novel matrix for causal explanations in the climate
change context. The focus in that part rests on the logical fundamentals of legal causation, represented by the existing elements
of necessity and sufficiency and, as will be explained and discussed in detail, a new element: sustenance. Sustenance is defined
CLIMATE CHANGE AND CAUSATION: JOINING LAW AND..., 27 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 49
 © 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
as the capacity of a factor to protect or maintain an effect despite certain structural *52  changes in the model.7 With this matrix,
the article provides some groundwork that can be used in future judicial reasoning, especially if courts establish themselves
as “cooperative courts,” where “specific judgements will make novel and eminently compelling statements that a resonate in
courts in other jurisdictions.”8 However, its potential use goes beyond litigation, as certainty on the threshold requirements of
legally meaningful causal connections is an important prerequisite for identifying and presenting relevant scientific evidence
and using this evidence not only in courts but also for advancing international and domestic law which is designed to managing
climate change.9
The main argument we develop is as follows. There is sufficient robust evidence to establish a strong causal connection between
historic and future anthropogenic GHG emissions, an increase in the global mean surface temperature and the severity and
frequency of certain individual severe weather and climate related events. To capture this evidence, we introduce the term
“distinctive causal field.” This term thus denotes a strong causal connection between anthropogenic emissions and an increase
in the likelihood and intensity of classes10 (or types) of extreme events.
*53  Probabilistic event attribution is used to present the evidence for specific extreme events that can be attributed to certain
emitters. Based on formal logic, we open the legal concept to scientific findings where a concrete climate impact can be attributed
to a specific emitter.11 This is achieved by introducing the property of “sustenance” with which Judea Pearl-- known for his
theory of causal and counterfactual inference based on structural models--has revolutionised our understanding of causation
across scientific and sociolegal research.12 Sustenance is used where the logical elaborations of necessity and sufficiency alone
are inadequate to fully capture cause-quality in law. It is a key notion to make causal inferences within our matrix. In the context
of climate change, and potentially beyond,13 this additional property accounts for components of a set of conditions which can
be concurrent causes. The argument is developed in three parts, followed by a conclusion.
Beginning with an explanation of our use of the terms “cause” and “concurrent cause” in Part I, we briefly present some specific
categories of cases where the traditional tests for causation *54  have failed and prompted normative adjustments. We introduce
the case Lluiya v. RWE as a specific case in point to demonstrate three main constraints that the current causal inquiry entails in
climate litigation. Part II explains the recent developments and the methods in the field of probabilistic event attribution. This
part explains how scientists establish specific evidence that relates the fraction of the attributable increase in the occurrence
frequency and intensity of individual extreme weather and climate related (slow onset) events to certain emitters.14 Part III joins
law and climate science and introduces a thorough discussion of the criteria of necessity, sufficiency and sustenance, including
previous attempts to systemically capture concurrent causes in law. We then introduce our proposal of a new matrix for causal
explanations in the climate change context. This rests on three pillars, each of them addressing one of the main constraints of
the current causal tests. The new matrix thus remains firmly based on the existing counterfactual inquiry but uses an extended
logical basis. This allows us to reconcile probabilistic attribution and the various confidence levels which attach to the evidence,
for causes that are at least concurrent causes, in a coherent concept of causation in law.15
II. The Current Legal Framework for Causal Analysis
Despite the fact that differences in the law apply across jurisdictions, the core idea of any causal explanation in law is that
mere co-relations between factors can be distinguished from mechanisms *55  that cause one factor to produce another.16 We
understand the term “cause” as such factor that can produce an event, without pre-selecting a deterministic or probabilistic
relation between the factor and the event that follows.17 Conversely, the term is used in a wider sense to explain that an event
has been produced and a factor will qualify as “cause” of this event if it has at least increased the probability of the event's
occurrence in a statistically significant way.18 On that basis, a “concurrent cause” is defined as “an act or event or a state of
nature which initiates or permits ... in conjunction with other causes a sequence of events resulting in an effect.”19 This captures
factors that form part of a set of conditions and multi-stage scenarios where a chain of factors lead to an event.
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Across most legal systems,20 and despite many differences across jurisdictions which cannot be discussed in detail here, the
core test for causation follows a bifurcated approach.21 The first limb is factual causation, where a counterfactual inquiry seeks
to identify the factor that was necessary or sufficient for the event. The *56  second limb is finding the legally relevant cause.
This involves normative considerations,22 to establish which factor was relevant and which was not, or not to the same extent,
and to elude the strictness of a mechanistic application of the test. In the next section, we trace some of the legal developments
where the strictness of the causal analysis is coupled with normative correctives, along with the challenges that this presents to
a coherent concept of causation. This section demonstrates that our approach is not as radical as it may seem at first instance. It
ties in with the observation that pragmatic judicial reasoning surrounds the quest for causal explanations in cases where justice
demands a deviation from a strict approach.
A. Resolving the Harshness of “But For” and “Conditio Sine Qua Non”--Examples Outside Climate Change
The “but for” test derived from tort law asks whether the harm would have occurred but for the action concerned? The “conditio
sine qua non” test which is most familiar to the lawyer from a civil law tradition seeks to define the causal link based on similar
counterfactual considerations. Both approaches claim to establish a causal link from a logical-scientific perspective. Using a
counterfactual inquiry, the cause-quality of a factor is assessed by a process of elimination of the relevant factor in mind.23
Consequently, every cause, that cannot be thought to be non-existent without omitting the event in question, is considered to
be a factual cause.
Under the limb of legal causation, normative correctives are then applied to identify the factor that not only was necessary for the
result as factual cause but is also different from other factors or mere circumstances which are not included in the consideration
of the causal chain.24 However, normative correctives are also applied to *57  find the cause in exceptional cases where a strict
test of causation would contravene law's consideration of fairness and justice.25 The following section briefly explores some
examples of this approach used in the area of the law of torts, thereby considering aspects of procedural law and substantive
law that incorporate normative determinations.
Allocating the burden of proof, setting the threshold of certainty to distribute risks, and shifting the burden of proof, are
normative determinations for which the procedural law can account.26 Generally, “but for” causation in the common law of torts
entails that a claimant must prove that there was more than a fifty percent chance that the breach of the duty caused the harm.27 In
other words, the action may not be the only factor that causes the type of harm but in the specific situation it must have been the
most likely one.28 The “conditio sine qua non” test used in civil law jurisdictions does not comprise a clear numerical threshold
but requires that the court is convinced that a causal link exists.29 Courts may also apply normative correctives which result in
shifting the burden of proof,30 or allow the claimant to prove only a substantial increase of the risk *58  which eventually led
to the harm if a material contribution to the harm itself cannot be proven.31
The main category of cases where the outcome of a strict causal analysis is adjusted on the basis of normative considerations
consists of concurrent causes in multi-stage scenarios or variations of cumulative causation. In these cases, none of the causes
on their own would satisfy the “but for” test or the theory of equivalent causation under the “conditio sine qua non” formula.
This could be either in a situation of alternative sufficient causation where other single factors32 or a set of factors could have
led to the same event33 or in a case where all factors must be present for the event to occur. The former situation of alternative
causation has been clarified in some jurisdictions, so that if “multiple acts exist, each of which alone would have been a factual
cause ... of the physical harm at the same time, each act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”34 Accordingly, uncertainty
in relation to the actual tortfeasor shifts the burden of proof onto the defendant.35
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In the United Kingdom (UK), a very specific exception developed for the legal treatment of concurrent causes in the so-called
*59  Fairchild line of cases. In these cases, a normatively modified approach was established for every single instance of
exposure to asbestos in consecutive employments that preceded the harm and increased its risk, even if it was not possible
to prove through which specific situation of exposure to asbestos the injury (mesothelioma) occurred.36 This was followed
by legislation to clarify that for this specific category of asbestos exposure cases, all past employers who contributed to the
increasing risk are severally and jointly liable, thus each of them is liable for the entire harm.37 The Fairchild exception has
not been extended into other areas so far.38
However, a further group of exceptional cases in the UK concerns the exposure of employees to harmful substances other than
asbestos. Here, part of the amount of the harmful substance is considered to be “allowed” and thus, labelled as “innocent,”
whereas any amount above this threshold falls into the category of being “guilty.”39 If then neither the innocent nor the guilty
amount alone are deemed as being able to cause the medical condition which the employee suffers, but the amounts together
are on the balance of probabilities causal for the harm and thus constitute a set of conditions, it is sufficient that the “guilty”
amount made a material contribution to the condition and the claimant is entitled to receive full compensation.40
*60  In Canada, legislation has overcome the barrier of a strict causal analysis in multi-stage scenarios involving concurrent
causes in tobacco litigation. For litigation relating to the recovery of healthcare costs, causation can be established on an
aggregate basis and liability is apportioned based on the market share of tobacco companies. Smoking related healthcare costs
from tobacco producers can thus be recovered on the basis of specific legislation that sets forth a formula determining the market
share and reverses the onus of proof.41 A slightly different situation of cumulative causation arises when concurrent causes
contributed a certain proportion to the harm which can be determined, for example when successive employers contributed
harmful substances through insufficient working conditions. English and German legal systems will hold each of them liable
in proportion to the contribution which can be measured in intensity and duration of exposure; none of the employers is liable
for the entire harm.42
Again at a general level, the continental approach to causation is structurally similar to the common law. It introduces normative
parameters for causal explanations and supplements these with further theories on the basis of statutory provisions, such as the
theory of “adequate causation” and the theory of the protective scope of the statutory norm.43 French law uses the equivalence
*61  theory combined with an explanatory theory for the concrete event.44 Under the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch, BGB), much effort has been dedicated to develop a coherent theory of causation from a bifurcated normative
perspective which views causation as a foundation of the existence (Haftungsbegründend) and the scope of the liability
(Haftungsausfüllend).45 For causation to be the foundation of liability, the theory of equivalence is the starting point, but this
theory is not conclusive of the extent of liability. The theory of adequate causation is used to eliminate unlikely factors from the
causal chain.46 This probability is measured ex ante, from the perspective of an objective bystander.47 A positive formulation
requires that the factor must have increased the probability of any event of such a kind in a not only negligible fashion, for
example harm that occurred following medical negligence in the treatment of an injury may still be considered as a consequence
of the cause that made the treatment necessary in the first place.48
Using normative correctives and reducing or reversing the burden of proof, are the conventional methods of the law to soften the
outcome of causal analysis. This facilitates a re-distribution of risk which often would not be achieved for concurrent causes on
the basis of the mechanistic “but for” or the “conditio sine qua non” test.49 However, applying these normative considerations
in specific cases, all of them outside climate change, does not resolve the systemic *62  difficulties that arise from the strict
causal analysis in the context of climate change. Further, it does not account for scientific evidence forecasting the likelihood
of future events based on past occurrences of similar events (for example heat waves) and case-specific evidence. This will
be demonstrated in the next section.
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B. Finding the Causal Link in Climate Litigation
Climate change litigation faces many obstacles, often revolving around procedural questions of standing50 and jurisdiction,51
but also as a consequence of applying criteria of established legal concepts--such as causation--to a new challenge.52 This is
neatly illustrated in the decision of the District Court of Essen in the case Lluiya v. RWE.53 The claimant, a Peruvian farmer
living in the Andes, asserts that his home and livelihood are threatened by the risk of flooding from a glacial lake outburst.
The glacial lake Palcacocha is damming glacial meltwater, the water is hold by a natural moraine (deposit of irregular mass
of debris from a glacier) and controlled by a set of basic pipes to reduce pressure. He claims from *63  the German Energy
provider RWE AG a pro rata financial contribution to flood protection measures in proportion to the company's GHG emissions
on the basis of Art. 1004 of the German Civil Code (BGB).54 The calculation of the compensation is derived from the report
on the quantified contribution of “carbon majors” to cumulative global GHG emissions.55 The report states that the company
contributed 0.47 percent to the global total.56 The Essen court held that RWE would not qualify as a disturber of the claimant's
property in the absence of equivalent and adequate causation.57 Applying the strict “conditio sine qua non” test of causation, the
court was not satisfied that the contribution of RWE could be considered to be significant given the existence of multiple other
pollutants, despite acknowledging that the company was a major emitter. However, “in the light of the millions and billions of
emitters worldwide” the court was unable to conclude that anthropogenic climate change, and consequently the purported flood
risks of the glacial lake, would not occur without RWE's emissions.
*64  The appeal against this judgment is currently pending in the second instance, the Regional Court in Hamm.58 After hearing
oral arguments, the Hamm court ordered evidence to be heard.59 Under German procedural law, this means that the Hamm court
is of the opinion that the case is conclusively (similar to prima facie plausibly) argued60 and it is now a matter of providing
scientific evidence to answer the specific questions asked by the court.
In contrast to the Essen court, the Australian court in Gray v. Minister for Planning reasoned that merely because the concrete
contribution of certain emissions could not be accurately measured, this would not suggest that a causal link between the burning
of coal and the impact on the global climate was insufficient.61 The issue in question in that case, however, was whether a
sufficiently proximate link between mining and GHG emissions, including their impact on climate change, could be established
as part of an environmental impact assessment.62 Such a situation is different from the attribution of a concrete climate change
impact to not only the amount of global GHG emissions worldwide, but to a specific emitter as in Lliuya. It is also different
from the circumstances in Urgenda, where The Hague District Court and The Hague Court of Appeal both found a causal link
between emission intensity and the impacts of climate change,63 or the statement of the Supreme Court of Colombia *65  when
acknowledging that multiple simultaneous causes impact the ecosystem.64
These decisions are not considering the causal link between an individual climate related event and overall GHG emissions
worldwide or even attributing the event to a narrower group of emitters. They do, however, find a causal link between
accumulated emissions and increasing climate change impacts generally. On that basis, the most far-reaching decision in finding
a causal link between climate related events and a concrete source of emissions is Gloucester Resources Limited v. Minister for
Planning, where the New South Wales Land and Environment Court (“NSWLEC”) posited that there is a causal link between
the planned project (a new coal mining plant) and the project's cumulative GHG emissions and further climate change and its
related consequences.65 Interestingly, the court reasoned that it is sufficient that the project's emissions would “likely contribute
to the future changes to the climate system and impacts of climate change” and that the project was “likely to have indirect
impacts on the environment, including the climate system.”66 Thus, the NSWLEC acknowledged a causal link in the light of
the scientific treatment of corresponding uncertainty levels.
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This decision is one in an increasing number of climate litigation cases, demonstrating that systemic issues remain in the
application of the “but for” test of causation, when attributing specific climate related events to global GHG emissions or
concrete emitters. The following section summarizes, on the basis of the case law discussed in the two previous sections, three
systemic constraints of our conventional approach to test causation in the climate change context.
*66  C. Three Constraints for Causal Explanations
The existing framework of causal analysis confronts a coherent approach to causal explanations in the context of climate
change with three major constraints. The first constraint is that the current approach couples a strict causal test with normative
adjustments for some specific ex-post causal explanations, however, no such treatment has been devised at a comprehensive
level. The harshness of the causal test is only alleviated through case-specific normative correctives--none of these have been
sufficiently elaborated in the climate change context so far,67 leaving the strict “but for” analysis as the default position in law.
The second constraint is that the existing framework lacks the means of reflecting scientific evidence that makes projections
about changes in probability of any future weather or climate related events with various degrees of confidence levels. This
ignores the potential of climate science because it undermines the underlying question of causal analysis: How could the
attributed (weather or climate) event be prevented in the future? Portraying factual causation through a counterfactual enquiry
necessarily compares the existing world with a counterfactual world, where higher uncertainty is associated with the latter. The
“but for” test claims to be based on mathematical operations yet in reality is inherently limited by what we think would have
happened in the absence of the event. This not only presumes we can single out one specific factor but also that the *67  event
in its concrete form occurred because of this factor. It pretends certainty where always only degrees of likelihood can exist.68
A third and major constraint concerns the role of concurrent causes. The “but for” test neglects a contributing factor as potential
cause-candidate if it is not the only necessary or sufficient factor that is responsible for the event. The test does not provide a
tool for identifying concurrent causes that are components of a set of factors, where only the set in its entirety is sufficient for
an increased risk or harmful event, or in a situation where only a succession of events leads to the final result.
The following Part II briefly explains the emerging field of probabilistic event attribution, its methods and role in climate science,
including the two levels of uncertainty treatment in reporting research results. On that basis, Part III ties law and climate science
together and proposes a new matrix for causal explanations in the climate change context to address the three constraints.
III. Probabilistic Event Attribution
Causally explaining observed changes in the climate system has been the aim of a field of climate science known as detection
and attribution since Hasselmann in 1997 developed methodologies to attribute observed trends in global mean temperature
to known natural and anthropogenic drivers. In essence, a climate model is used to simulate global mean temperature with
and without anthropogenic GHG emissions finding that without these emissions the observed increase (1°C today69) cannot
be simulated. While traditional detection and attribution methods yield significant results only when trends are very strong,
changes in the probabilities of extreme events are subtler and could thus not be attributed to global GHG emissions at the time
of Hasselmann when climate models were extremely costly to run.
*68  A. Developments in a New Field of Climate Science
Today, climate science can determine that the Argentina heatwave in 2013-2014 was made five times more likely due to total
anthropogenic emissions and the European Union's emissions account for an increase of thirty seven percent in the likelihood
of this heat wave occurring.70 Rapid analyses are used to produce results immediately after an extreme event has occurred, for
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example to explain that the 2018 heatwave in Northern Europe was made at least twice to five times more likely to occur in
many places because of climate change.71
With the increased availability of large ensembles of climate models, a different field of detection and attribution has emerged:
probabilistic event attribution. While differences in the methodology exist,72 the main aim of this science is to answer the
question whether and to what extent anthropogenic climate change has altered the likelihood and intensity of an individual
extreme weather event to occur. Using climate modelling and statistical modelling, scientists estimate the probability of an
event to occur with climate change (“P1”) and in a counterfactual climate of a world without anthropogenic GHG emissions
(“P0”), thus causally linking the occurrence probability of severe weather events to external drivers of the climate system.73 On
that basis, it is then possible to quantitatively determine even the contribution of individual countries to the changing likelihood
*69  of certain extreme weather events as a result of these countries' emissions.74
Results of event attribution studies are expressed in risk ratios (“RR”), calculated as the ratio between the probability of an
event to occur in today's climate (“P1”) and an unchanged climate (“P0”), describing the change in occurrence frequency of
the event caused by anthropogenic climate change.
RR=P1/P0
Risk ratios are given with confidence intervals representing sampling and methodological uncertainties.75 The causal statement
thus entails the identification of a cause, such as increasing emissions, and represents a causal quantity in the shape of the
attributable risks.76 The design and framing of the attribution study is essential for the interpretation and any further use of
results that it delivers.77 In particular, the definition of the event that is studied is crucial. For example, defining the heatwave
of 2018 as a European temperature average over the whole season June to August will result in risk ratios that are much higher
compared to a more localized and impact focused definition like maximum heat stress in a city.78
A further significant differentiation is made between the types of events that are examined. While the Arctic heatwave in
December 2016 was made more than 1000 percent more likely due to anthropogenic GHG emissions with contributions of the
European Union and the United States alone doubling the risk, the rainfall event in the United Kingdom during January 2014
was made *70  forty percent more likely by total GHG emissions and only three percent more likely as a result of European
Union GHG emissions.79 It is also important to highlight that there are extreme events that are made less likely by anthropogenic
climate change while for others the risk is unchanged even in a changing climate and, crucially there are events for which current
methods and tools are not advanced enough to estimate the change in risk.80
While for a number of studied events and variables the climate change signal81 is relatively linear with global mean temperature
increase, this is not always the case. A linear pattern has been found to exist for some regional climate change impacts; for
others a quasi-exponential increase or a sigmoidal pattern of change exists.82 This means that defining a causal relation between
GHG emissions and a specific impact depends very strongly on the type of event, the region in the world and temporal and
spatial scales of the studied event.
A crucial implication of the development of probabilistic event attribution is that it cannot be applied only after an event has
happened and damage occurred. When vulnerabilities and thresholds are known, changing risks can be calculated ex ante. In
other words, the changing risks can be forecasted. The improvement of the methods allows geographically very specific events
to be anticipated and thus, appropriate adaptation measures can be designed.83
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B. Uncertainty Treatment in Probabilistic Event Attribution
There are two levels where uncertainty treatment plays a role. First, the probability concerning the causal link itself, for example,
*71  the anthropogenic GHG forcing increased the likelihood of intense rainfall as measured in the wake of hurricane Harvey
that hit Houston, Texas in August 2017 by a factor of 1.5 to five times.84 Second, the confidence level that is attached to this
statement; given that climate models are known to be not unbiased in representing hurricanes and only one other independent
study with similar findings exists, the confidence in this statement (on Hurricane Harvey) is only medium.85
These two levels of uncertainty are independent of whether a projected (ex-ante) or attributed (ex-post) change in the occurrence
frequency of an extreme event is large or small. For example, we have high confidence that anthropogenic climate change
increased the likelihood of extreme precipitation in UK winters by forty percent (likely range 0-100%) while we have medium
confidence that the 2015-2017 drought in Cape Town was made three times more likely (likely range factor 1.4 to 6.4).86 The
likelihood statements result from statistical analyses of climate data whereas the levels of confidence depend on the climatic
variables (temperature, precipitation, pressure, etcetera) analysed, availability and quality of observed *72  data, strength
of theory describing and understanding processes in the climate system, reliability of climate models and the availability of
evidence (number of scientific studies as well as number of independent data sources).
How can the increase in risk for which probabilistic event attribution provides the evidence be captured in a standardised causal
law? If there are other cumulative factors that contributed to an event and increase the likelihood of the future occurrence of
similar events of this kind, but none of the factors passes the traditional threshold set by the “but for” test, is it possible to find
a causal explanation? Intuitively, the answer might be positive, however, a more rigorous structural causal law exists and this
will be developed in the following part.
C. Three Pillars for Analysis in a New Matrix on Causation
The following part develops a model that addresses the three constraints of the conventional test of causation as discussed in
Part I, making use of probabilistic event attribution as introduced in Part II. The model is based on Pearl's explanation of his
theory of causation, which is grounded in logical elaborations of the notions of “necessary” and “sufficient” conditions and
complemented by “sustenance” as a final element. The model comprises three pillars.
The first pillar is derived from the logical elaborations of the notions of “necessary” and “sufficient” conditions,87 which already
underlie the legal concept of causation, to identify relevant factors of the causal chain. The strength of the causal connection
between these factors is then determined on the basis of the degrees of probability and the confidence levels with which scientific
results are reported for each of these factors.88 The transitivity theory is applied as a mathematical tool to reflect the logical
consequences that the *73  existence and the related strength of a causal link across factors in a multi-stage scenario entails.
The second pillar accounts for climate science, including probabilistic event attribution, to demonstrate that higher amounts of
GHG emissions increase the intensity and frequency of climate related events. We introduce the notion of the distinctive causal
field to capture this strong connection where sufficient event-specific evidence for a plurality of types of events exists.
The third pillar supplements the existing logical fundamentals with the notion of “sustenance” to offer a coherent approach
to causal explanations in the climate change context that includes concurrent causes. Probabilistic event attribution is used to
explicate the fraction of the attributable risk for a cause that is at least a concurrent cause.
i. Necessary and Sufficient Causation
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A causal relation between different factors and the degree of confidence that allows concluding from one factor to the existence
of another, are regularly established using the criteria of “necessity” and “sufficiency.” This reasoning already forms the basis
of our legal concept. It is concerned with providing proof at every stage of the structural chain of events that the premises imply
a certain conclusion.89
The following explains causation as a fundamental logical concept, based on the relation between two factors, we call them at
this stage “N” and “S.” S is a sufficient condition for N if it is true if there is S, we know that there is also N. It is possible to say
that S implies N, or whenever there is S, then N is also true. That does not imply that N will only be true if there is S: N may
also occur in the absence of S, where another factor leads to N. However, S cannot be true without N being present, because
N is necessary for S. If we *74  could establish that N will only be true in the case if S is present, we could conclude that N
and S are equivalent conditions, where both are sufficient and necessary for each other at the same time. Such an equivalent
relation between N and S indicates a very strong causal connection.
The law does not always explicitly discuss necessity and sufficiency and it does not require an equivalent relation to establish
the “actual cause.” However, the counterfactual “but for” test reflects the strong influence of the necessity element to establish
causation in law and consideration to the sufficiency element is given in cases where one main factor lead to the event in
question.90 Causal claims on the basis of necessary and sufficient conditions can be made in varying shades, depending on the
evidence that is available. High levels of confidence and event-specific evidence explicate a strong causal connection between
two factors.91
In returning to our climate change context, we now establish the causal connection on the basis of these two existing logical
fundamentals, between the following four factors that climate scientists identify in the multi-stage scenario of anthropogenic
climate change: “E,” “T,” “IF,” and “IS”. These will be explained in turn. E denotes the quantity of anthropogenic GHG
emissions.92 T stands for the increase of global mean surface temperature. IF captures the impacts of a changing climate
consisting of a general tendency of increasing frequency and severity of some weather events and (climate related) slow onset
events. IS denotes the occurrence of a concrete climate change impact, either a severe weather event or a slow onset event.
If there is to be a causal link between a concrete climate impact IS (for instance severe flooding, a specific heatwave or a
hurricane) and E, explaining the relations between and E and T, between T and IF and E and IF are key steps for the investigation
whether IS could have been anticipated (and thus avoided) and we *75  proceed with this before turning to the direct link
between E and IS, for which attribution science can now also provide the scientific evidence.
Further, a binary relation over a set of factors can generally be qualified as a transitive composition of binary variables, if a
chainlike process exists where it is true that “X causes Y and Y causes Z regardless of X, it can be concluded that X causes
Z.”93 From our understanding of processes in the atmosphere, observational analyses and climate modelling, we know that
the occurrence of extraordinary global-scale heat waves, some extreme precipitation events,94 droughts and storms in some
areas,95 cannot be explained without human-induced climate change.96 These impacts of climate change IF, allow us to identify
E as cause for IF where there is a transitive relationship between E, T, and IF. If the relation between E and T and T and IF is
transitive that means that E is also and in the same way related to IF. To put it differently, this establishes a causal link between
GHG emissions and the general increase in frequency and severity in climate change impacts. Transitivity also maintains the
strength of the causal relation over the entire set of factors.
Consequently, if we establish a causal relation between an increase of E and the increase in T and the increase in T and increasing
frequency and severity of climate change impacts IF, a causal relation between the increase of E and IF can also be determined.
Depending on the strength of the causal explanation (the level of confidence), this thus allows us to anticipate IS where IS a
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narrower defined event comprised within IF. The following part ties in the *76  scientific evidence between E, T and IF before
then taking a closer look at the relation between E and IS.
There is sufficient scientific evidence that the present increase in T would not have happened without the increase in E97 and
more than ninety seven percent of actively publishing climate scientists agree.98 The evidence for the relation between E and
T has grown further in the last decade and the confidence level is expressed as virtually certain for the human influence as the
dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-twentieth century.99 Cumulative total GHG emissions and the response
of T are approximately linearly related.100 The contribution of E to the increase in T was likely to be in the range of 0.5°C to
1.3°C during the period 1951 to 2010 and is approximately 1°C today.101
This means that between the increase in E and the increasing T exists even an equivalent relation. Both are necessary and
sufficient conditions for one another. Increasing E is a necessary condition of the increase of T since 1880. T would not have
occurred without E and E is also a sufficient condition for T, because this very concrete temperature increase is a consequence
of E. No other factor explains the increase in T.
Scientific evidence further shows that an increase of T implies the occurrence of some more intense and more frequent severe
weather events and slow onset events.102 There has been further *77  strengthening of the evidence for human influence on
the frequency and intensity of daily temperature extremes since the mid-twentieth century, and it is very likely that a human
induced increase in average mean temperatures has more than doubled the probability of occurrence of heat waves in some
locations.103 Changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been observed since about 1950.104 Slow onset events,
such as glacial retreat, can be measured globally and over the last two decades, the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have been
losing mass, glaciers have continued to shrink, and Arctic sea ice and Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover have continued
to decrease in extent (high confidence).105
Up to this point, a strong causal connection can be demonstrated in the form of equivalent causation between E and T and
between T and IF as a general trend, or expected consequence, which means that E and IF are also both, necessary and sufficient
conditions in accordance with the transitivity theory. It is correct to say that E implies IF, E and IF display an equivalent relation
and thus a very strong causal connection.
ii. Distinctive Causal Field
We introduce the notion distinctive causal field to capture this strong connection between E and IF, where IF is the general trend
of extreme weather and climate related events for which sufficient event-specific evidence for a plurality of similar climate
events (for example heat waves) exists. The term causal field was first introduced by Anderson and revived by Mackie to explain
that all causal claims are made in a certain context, for instance against the *78  background of certain theories or a set of facts
which are considered to be common, in order to identify the one factor that was different from the causal field on a particular
occasion.106 The term distinctive causal field is used here in a slightly modified version, influenced by the view of Lewis on
events that share a common causal history,107 to describe the general context of expected events within which causation of a
single climate related impact is examined.
In addition to using the causal explanation between E, T and IF to understand the likelihood of IS as just demonstrated, the causal
link between E and IS can now be established directly using probabilistic event attribution. Thus, changes in E lead directly
to impacts as well as via the increased T and the direct link between E and IS can be observed and measured in accordance
with this new scientific evidence. These impacts concern changes in the likelihood and intensity of extreme weather events,
such as heat waves in large parts of Europe, Asia and Australia and an increased frequency or intensity of heavy precipitation
events in North America and Europe.
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Further impacts include slow onset events such as changes in Northern Hemisphere March-April (spring) average snow cover;
the reduction of the extent of Arctic July-August-September (summer) average sea ice with average temperature anomalies
exceeding widely 2°C and 3°C in places;108 changes in global mean upper ocean (0-700 meters) and global mean sea level
rise.109 The next section accounts for this new scientific evidence in the specific relation between E and IS. It introduces the
notion of sustenance to portray E as “concurrent cause” for IS in law.
iii. INUS Condition, NESS Condition, Sustenance
The scientific evidence that establishes an equivalent relation between E and IF encompasses a strong causal connection for
all events that form part of the distinctive causal field. The existence of this distinctive causal field is important for assessing
future risks *79  using climate modelling and socioeconomic scenarios110 and for the anticipation of structurally similar events.
In addition, as discussed, attribution science identifies E as a cause-candidate in climate modelling for impacts IS where E is
directly linked to IS. But if E is only part of a set of other factors and not the dominant cause, the law lacks the capacity to
respond to these scientific findings. Thus, how can the increase in risk for which probabilistic event attribution provides the
evidence, be captured in a standardized causal law, for example to explain causation in our case Lluiya v. RWE?
In the literature on formal logic, a variety of concepts have been discussed to find a structural causal law that accounts for
concurrent causes in multi-stage scenarios. Mackie contended that a cause is at a minimum an “Insufficient, but Non-redundant
part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition,” he calls this an “INUS” condition.111 His explanation of “cause” reflects
Mill's idea of defining the cause as “the sum of the total of the conditions positive and negative.”112 Mackie's famous example
is that even though an electrical short-circuit causes a fire, it is an insufficient condition on its own, because other conditions
such as oxygen are needed in addition, it is non-redundant, because in this concrete instance it produced the spark. A fire can
start without electrical short-circuit, it is thus unnecessary, but the whole set of conditions on this occasion was sufficient to
start the fire.
Assuming that E is insufficient for a concrete IS, for instance a tropical cyclone, E could still be an insufficient but non-redundant
part of an unnecessary condition which is in its entirety sufficient on this occasion-- cyclones have happened in the absence of
E--but for a concrete occurrence of a particular cyclone, E could participate as part or of the sufficient condition.
In Lliuya, if E would only qualify as part of a set of sufficient conditions, it could entail that E does not pass the test for equivalent
or “but for” causation, even if it increases the risk, as was the result of the causal analysis of the Essen court. The influence of
*80  the causal risk factor E depends on the prevalence of complementary causes in a set that together represents the sufficient
cause.113 In the current framework of causal analysis, as demonstrated by the Essen court, a strict test does not reflect the
contribution of the concurrent cause. Only ex post, that is if the risk materializes, could normative parameters (if available and
applicable) be used to portray that IS (in the example a glacial lake outburst) was partially caused by E.
Conversely, the INUS condition provides a minimum threshold for causation, which so far has been occupied solely by the
requirement of the cause being a necessary or sufficient condition under the “but for” veil which creates the need for further
normative corrections as discussed above. Should INUS conditions be included in developing legally meaningful explanations
in the context of climate change impacts? An earlier attempt to translate INUS conditions into a legal threshold was undertaken
by Wright who diagnosed an urgent need of repair of causation in the law of torts and developed the Necessary Element of
a Sufficiency Set (“NESS”) test. Like the INUS test, the NESS test subordinates the necessity element under the sufficiency
element of causation.114 It offers a better explanation than the “but for” test, however, sharing the same ontological framework
as Mackie's INUS condition means that the NESS test is susceptible to the same criticism.115
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Pearl agrees with the tests set forth by INUS and NESS in so far as he claims that the sufficiency component should be given
additional weight in law as it draws the attention to the consequences of one's action.116 At the same time, he confronts Mackie's
INUS condition and its NESS relative with strong criticism, which is echoed by others in the discourse on formal logic. The
major flaw that Pearl identifies is that it is impossible, without further limitations, *81  to extrapolate from INUS and NESS
conditions a structural-causal law that distinguishes between formulae that represent stable mechanisms and those that represent
circumstantial conditions.117 If such a standard logical syntax cannot be derived from INUS or NESS conditions, he argues that
no causal law allowing for causal generalization can exist.
Jaegwon Kim--known for his research on the metaphysics of causation--proposes a way to resolve this shortcoming.118 He
calls for entities that possess both, an element of generality and an element of particularity; the former is necessary for making
sense of the relations of necessity and sufficiency, and the latter for making sense of singular causal judgments. In the specific
situation of climate change, this could be applied by comparing the ex ante causal explanation (forecast or projection) with
the ex post causal explanation (attribution). Or to be more concrete, to focus on those events where the impacts that occurred,
instantiate specific impacts IS that qualitatively follow our expectation and forecast for IF.
However, that would on the one hand limit the causal analysis to cases where the risk indeed has materialized and harm is
suffered (and thus further entertain a bifurcated conceptual approach to causation) and on the other hand also exclude cases
where no projections are available for IS despite the existence of IF and the fact that the event in question represents a structurally
similar instantiation of this distinctive causal field.
Pearl resolves the problem by adding a further component which ties in with the counterfactual approach. Following on from
what Hall calls dependence (similar to necessity) and production (close to sufficiency), Pearl introduces the notion of sustenance
to supplement the counterfactual analysis.119 Sustenance measures the capacity of the cause to protect or maintain the effect
under structural changes in the model.120 It translates the idea of Lewis on *82  “quasi dependence” into a syntax where
contingencies are modified to test the resulting effect and thus, the ability of the factor to sustain it.121 Pearl translates the causal
law into a mathematical formula:
“W” is in the following a set of variables which form part of a climate model, and let “w,” “w”' be specific realizations of these
variables. The set of variable represents our (modelled) world u. We say that x causally sustains y in u relative to contingencies
W = w, w' if and only if
(i) X(u) = x;
(ii) Y(u) = y;
(iii) Yxw(u) = y for all w; and
(iv) Yx'w'(u) = y' ≠ y for some x' ≠ x and some w'.
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The sustenance feature is represented in (iii). It means that x will maintain y even if we set W to any value w. (iv) explains
that only x will sustain y. Thus, if we change x to x', then Y will relinquish the current value y (we could also say the effect
will change), for at least one setting of W = w'.122
We define as follows:
x=E,
Y=IS
W= a set of conditions, with w being variables of the set
U=our (modelled) world.
E is a cause if it will sustain IS even if w will change. For instance, the fraction of the risk that is attributable to GHG emissions
for the risk of flooding remains stable in proportion to the amount of GHG emissions, even if conditions (w) of the model are
changed, such as improving flood protection measures. While the overall risk of flooding may change, the proportion of this
risk that is produced by E remains the same. Only if we change E, for *83  instance lower emissions, then there will be at least
one set of conditions where IS will change (the risk of flooding decreases).
This formula reflects the modelling used in probabilistic event attribution, where the divergence between counterfactual worlds
and the actual world are simulated by changing contingency factors, such as changing emissions to measure the effect on the
climate and the occurrence of climate related events. It can also be used in law, since it is based on logical fundamentals to which
our legal concept can adapt. The reasoning based on necessity and sufficiency is extended by a further factor which accounts
for a concurrent cause that produces the effect without being necessary or sufficient on its own.
A structural analysis using all three elements for the analysis can thus supply causal information derived from climate models.
In our example case Lluiya, the first step is to establish the causal link between E and IF, in this case the concentration of GHG
emissions in the atmosphere and the general increase in frequency and intensity of glacial ice loss. E can be identified as part
of the component factors and the contribution to the risk can be quantified, based on the knowledge of the impact of E on
glaciers within IF, climate modelling and additional case-particularistic information.123 A specific model could then be chosen
to establish further case-particularistic evidence for the relation between E and IS. Here, E may be one factor that forms part
of a set of factors that cause the immediate risk, and if E is producing the proportional increase in risk for variations of other
factors it is true to say that E sustains IS. Further, only E will sustain IS if a change of E (defined as a change from x to x' in
step iv) will change our event IS for at least one setting of conditions (w) in the climate model. The causal statement will at
every stage include a reference to the fraction of the attributable risk for IS and the confidence levels that is attached to the
scientific evidence. Thus, much will depend on the availability of scientific evidence *84  and the strength of this data varies
for different climate related events and regions.
The advantage of the here presented formula is that this causal account does not stipulate an entire new counterfactual world in
which no climate impacts exist. Conversely, it asserts that it is possible to structurally change some factors of the world which
constitutes the model, and to see if the studied climate event is still maintained. This limits the counterfactual analysis to certain
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factors and the knowledge about the real world--and the type-level impacts that constitute the distinctive causal field can be
used for the modelling. Sustenance establishes causation even if the anthropogenic increase in GHG concentrations represent
only a (potentially small) part of a set of conditions.
In a further and final step, E can then be more narrowly defined as only the European Union's GHG emissions or the emissions of
a major carbon emitter. On that basis, the concrete contribution of (a more narrowly defined) E can be quantified. The calculated
fraction of the attributable climate risk to the defined emitter can be articulated in law: it is at least a concurrent cause.
IV. Conclusion
This article has used elementary tools of formal logic to build a novel matrix of causally explaining the relation between GHG
emissions and climate change impacts. We offer an approach that allows making causal statements in law about the physical
reality of climate phenomena, side by side with probabilistic evidence that defines the relations between factors and events of
our changing climate.
There is robust evidence that an equivalent causal relationship exists between the increase in GHG emissions due to the burning
of fossil fuels and the increase in severity and frequency of certain severe weather and climate related events. These events
constitute a distinctive causal field. In addition to that, the property of sustenance is key to portraying the cause-quality of the
anthropogenic emissions factor in a multistage scenario with several causes forming a set of conditions, where the mechanistic
“but for” or *85  “conditio sine qua non” tests would fail in finding a cause even though a factor contributed to the event; a
situation for which case-specific normative correctives have not yet been developed. The novel matrix is thus based on necessity,
sufficiency and sustenance.
We have demonstrated that based on this extended logical causal analysis, the concept of causation in law is compatible with
scientific uncertainties and the complexity of anthropogenic climate change. Our approach of opening a seemingly strict causal
test to include sustenance as a further analytical property, is based on the observation that normative correctives influence
the identification of the “actual cause” in other areas of law; in fact, pragmatic judicial reasoning surrounds the quest for
causal explanations. Indeed, concentrating on causation as a pre-determined rigid concept is one of the greatest impediments
for the legal response to climate change and law's capacity to use scientific evidence. It limits options on adaptation and risk
preparedness,124 and it reduces the adjudicative capacity of courts.125
Conversely, identifying legally meaningful causal explanations has several implications. It contributes, but is not limited, to
building the adjudicative capacity of courts challenged by climate litigation. It also has a much wider impact for the potential
of developing a “duty of care” of GHG emitters and influencing future legal developments under the 2015 Paris Climate
Agreement. Given that sufficient data will not be available for all climate related events and risks and those data are particularly
limited in the most vulnerable countries, leaving causal explanations to be tested in courts alone raises ethical concerns such as
equal access to justice. Thus, *86  the legal-political realm might be well advised to utilize causal explanations de lege ferenda.
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